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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
____________ 
No. 16-1144 
_____________ 
 
HEALTH SCIENCE FUNDING, LLC, 
                                                                       Appellant 
v. 
THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES;  
COMMISSIONER NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 2-15-cv-02933) 
District Judge:  Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo 
       
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on July 12, 2016 
 
 
 
Before:  SMITH, JORDAN and RENDELL Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2016) 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 Health Science Funding, LLC (HSF) sued the New Jersey Department of Human 
Services (DHS) and its acting commissioner, Elizabeth Connolly, for allegedly violating 
a provision of the Medicaid Act governing drug reimbursements.  The District Court 
dismissed HSF’s complaint, and HSF appealed. We will affirm the District Court’s order. 
I.  
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and 
procedural history of this case, we recite only a brief summary here. HSF sells Prastera, a 
lupus treatment. HSF alleges that, in 2014, it signed a rebate agreement with the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) that required DHS, as CMS’s agent in New 
Jersey, to pay for Prastera for Medicaid recipients, but that DHS has refused to do so. 
HSF sued DHS and Connolly in her official capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
claimed that DHS’s failure to pay for Prastera violated the Medicaid Act, relying on 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(54). The District Court dismissed this claim, holding that 
§ 1396a(a)(54) does not create a federal right, and so HSF cannot enforce a violation of it 
through § 1983.1 HSF appeals that ruling.2   
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court also dismissed HSF’s other claim, which alleged a violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. HSF has not challenged that ruling on appeal.  
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II.  
 “In order to seek redress through § 1983 . . . a plaintiff must assert the violation of 
a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.”  Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 
329, 340 (1997). In Blessing, the Supreme Court articulated the three factors to which it 
has traditionally looked “when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives 
rise to a federal right”:  
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit 
the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly 
protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement 
would strain judicial competence.  Third, the statute must unambiguously 
impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision 
giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than 
precatory, terms.  
 
Id. at 340–41 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
 But a court’s inquiry does not end here. In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court 
noted that Blessing had been interpreted by some courts as “allowing plaintiffs to enforce 
a statute under § 1983 so long as the plaintiff falls within the general zone of interest that 
the statute is intended to protect; something less than what is required for a statute to 
create rights enforceable directly from the statute itself under an implied private right of 
action.” 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). The Court “reject[ed] the notion that [its] cases permit 
anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought 
under § 1983.” Id. According to the Court, the fundamental question in determining 
whether a statute confers a federal right is whether Congress expressed its intent to create 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We “review[] the District Court’s decision on a motion to 
dismiss de novo.” McTernan v. City of York, Penn., 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).   
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such a right “in clear and unambiguous terms.” Id. at 290. To answer that question, a 
court must examine whether the “statute by its terms grants . . . private rights to any 
identifiable class”—that is, whether its text is “phrased in terms of the persons 
benefited.” Id. at 284 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 We have interpreted Gonzaga University as requiring “us to first apply the three 
components of the Blessing test and then, to inquire into whether the statutes in question 
unambiguously confer a substantive right.” Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Ctrs.-Glen 
Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 527 (3d Cir. 2009). Applying this inquiry in Grammer, we held that 
a plaintiff whose mother had died while she was a resident in a state-run nursing home 
could sue the facility under § 1983 for allegedly violating certain provisions of the 
Medicaid Act that established standards of care in these nursing homes. Under these 
provisions, for example, a nursing home was required to “care for its residents in such a 
manner and in such an environment as will promote maintenance or enhancement of the 
quality of life of each resident.” Id. at 524 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(1)(A)). A nursing 
home resident was also guaranteed “[t]he right to be free from physical or mental abuse, 
corporal punishment, involuntary seclusion, and any physical or chemical restraints 
imposed for the purpose of discipline or convenience and not required to treat the 
resident’s medical symptoms.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii)). We first 
concluded that these provisions easily satisfied the Blessing factors. We next determined 
that, in these provisions, Congress “use[d] rights-creating language sufficient to 
unambiguously confer individually enforceable rights,” emphasizing how it had 
employed language that stressed “explicitly identified rights” of “residents.” Id. at 530–
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31. We thus held that the plaintiff could enforce these statutory provisions via § 1983, as 
they satisfied “both Gonzaga Univ.’s insistence on rights-creating language as evidence 
of Congressional intent and Blessing’s remaining factors.” Id. at 532; see also, e.g., 
Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that other 
provisions of the Medicaid Act created federal rights enforceable via § 1983 because they 
not only satisfied the Blessing factors but “conferred specific entitlements on individuals 
in terms that could not be clearer” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).     
 Here, by contrast, § 1396a(a)(54) states simply that, if a state plan “provides 
medical assistance for covered outpatient drugs (as defined in section 1396r-8(k) of this 
title),” that plan must “comply with the applicable requirements of section 1396r-8 of this 
title.” Although 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8, in turn, effectively requires a state to pay for a drug 
that is subject to a rebate agreement between a drug manufacturer and the federal 
government, see Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, 538 
U.S. 644, 652 (2003), HSF has not pointed to any specific language in the text of 
§ 1396r-8 that clearly and unambiguously evidences Congress’s intent to grant a drug 
manufacturer like itself a federal right to enforce a state’s failure to do so. Nor can we 
find any. Section 1396a(a)(54) therefore does not convey “an unambiguous articulation 
and conferral of [a] right[] by Congress,” Sabree, 367 F.3d at 188, and “entirely lack[s] 
the sort of ‘rights-creating’ language critical to showing the requisite congressional intent 
to create new rights,” as the District Court correctly held, Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 287 
(citations omitted).    
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
